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Abstract 
In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang 
promised to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid and improvement of 
relations with Washington. An international consortium led by the United States was created to 
implement the key provisions of the deal, including the delivery of two light water reactor 
(LWR) units. While multi-national efforts are common in commercial nuclear projects, the case 
of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was unique. KEDO’s 
challenges ranged from the lack of diplomatic relations between its main members and North 
Korea, to the country’s poor infrastructure. This paper examines KEDO’s experience and 
concludes that cooperation among its member states—Japan, South Korea, the United States and 
others—helped ensure the project’s financial and political feasibility, even if work did not 
proceed smoothly. While the construction of the LWRs was never completed due to larger 
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Introduction 
 
Following a dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over its past 
plutonium production, North Korea declared in 1993 that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This touched off a prolonged crisis that threatened to escalate 
into military conflict in the spring of 1994. The crisis was resolved with the signing of the 
Agreed Framework in October of that year after a series of contentious talks between the United 
States and North Korea.1 
 
The Agreed Framework sought not only to end the North Korean nuclear program but also to 
fundamentally change the relationship between the United States and North Korea, which never 
established diplomatic ties following the Korean War. The central elements of the agreement 
included North Korea’s commitment to shut down and eventually dismantle its graphite-
moderated reactors, and to remain a party to the NPT. In exchange, the United States promised to 
provide North Korea with two light water reactor (LWR) units, compensate the country for the 
loss of energy production from its shutdown reactor with another form of energy while the 
LWRs were being constructed, and begin taking steps to improve relations with Pyongyang.2 
 
The reason the United States agreed to provide North Korea with LWR units is because they are 
less proliferation-prone than graphite-moderated reactors. The nuclear waste that the LWRs 
produce is more difficult to divert to nuclear weapons compared to the material produced by 
their graphite-moderated counterparts. LWRs are also easier to safeguard compared to the 
graphite moderated reactors. An additional benefit for the United States was the fact that North 
Korea did not have the ability to make its own fuel rods for LWRs, and needed to depend on 
overseas suppliers.3  
 
U.S. negotiators, however, immediately realized that the cost of the reactors, estimated at over 
$4.6 billion, was more than the United States was willing to shoulder alone. KEDO was founded 
partly as a solution to these financing concerns.4 The U.S. negotiators insisted to their North 
Korean counterparts that the Agreed Framework make clear that an international consortium will 
be established to build the LWRs and ship alternative energy to North Korea.5 
 
What did KEDO achieve, and did the multilateral cooperation embodied in KEDO help its 
mission? This paper first discusses KEDO’s membership, mission, and challenges. It then lists 
the organization’s achievements during its years of operation, including whether it served to 
promote nonproliferation norms. It then analyzes which aspects were helped or hindered by 
multilateral cooperation. Finally, the paper discusses some of the problems that were left 




KEDO’s members, mission and challenges 
 
KEDO was officially founded in March 1995 in New York by Japan, South Korea and the 
United States, as an international organization under U.S. law.6 The organization’s charter 
stipulated three main tasks: The first was to finance and construct two LWR units in North 
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Korea, the second was to provide North Korea with interim energy alternatives until the first of 
the reactors were completed, and the third was to carry out any other measures needed for the 
implementation of the Agreed Framework.7 
 
Over the next two years, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Chile, and Argentina 
joined the organization. The European Union joined in 1997 with representation on the 
Executive Board to reflect the size of its financial contribution to the project.8 By 2000, the 
number of member countries totaled 13. 
 
Russia did not join KEDO, despite its interest in nuclear developments in North Korea. While 
U.S. chief negotiator Robert Gallucci appears to have preferred to build Russian LWRs in North 
Korea as part of the KEDO project, that idea was deemed infeasible due to Japan’s fears of 
having the Russian reactors constructed nearby so soon after the Chernobyl incident and due to 
South Korea’s strong desire to provide the reactors.9 Russia also initially reacted negatively to 
the Agreed Framework, claiming that it created a bad precedent.10 Russia later hinted that it 
wanted a seat on KEDO’s Executive Board, but that notion was rejected by KEDO, as Moscow 
was unwilling to provide significant funds for the project.11 In contrast, China was generally 
supportive of the Agreed Framework, but Beijing did not play an active role in KEDO, saying 
that it could be more useful by staying outside of the organization.12  
 
KEDO faced unique challenges. While multinational projects are common for commercial 
nuclear projects, the complexities involved were unusual because KEDO’s founding members 
had historically hostile relations with North Korea.13 Neither Japan, South Korea, nor the United 
States had diplomatic relations with the North. This meant that in addition to the normal 
constraints that such a project may face, KEDO had additional concerns, ranging from the 
security of its employees working on North Korean soil to the larger political landscape 
impacting its operations. 
 
The LWR project was also different from normal civilian nuclear cooperation projects, as the 
reactors were to be constructed in exchange for North Korean nonproliferation commitments. 
While a few countries had given up their nuclear weapons programs in exchange for economic 
assistance and improved relations with the West, this was a rare case that involved an exchange 
of a set of proliferation-prone reactors for more proliferation-resistant ones.14  
 
North Korea also lacked the technical experience, skill, and infrastructure to construct and 
operate the South Korean reactors. For example, the North Korean regulatory authorities lacked 
the expertise to provide oversight for the LWR project, and the North Korean grid was not 
capable of handling the large electric load from the plants.15 The reactors were also North 
Korea’s first multibillion-dollar, Western-style construction project.16 
 
 
What did KEDO achieve? 
 
Due to the unique conditions noted above, KEDO had few precedents to rely on. One of KEDO’s 
first major achievements was the conclusion in December 1995 of the Supply Agreement, which 
detailed how the LWR project would be carried out and how work was to be divided between 
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KEDO and North Korea. The agreement was concluded nine months after the date that the 
Agreed Framework parties agreed to make “best efforts” to conclude it,17 reflecting the general 
delay in the implementation of the Framework.  
 
Based on this agreement, KEDO and North Korea also negotiated eight protocols that were 
needed for implementing the project.18 The lack of diplomatic relations between North Korea 
and the original KEDO founders complicated this process. For example, in order to allow KEDO 
personnel—mainly Americans, Japanese and South Koreans—to visit the North Korean 
construction site, the parties agreed that the employees should use KEDO identification cards 
that served the same function as passports.19 The protocol on transportation allowed goods to be 
shipped from South Korea to North Korea by designated points on land, sea and air, but not 
through the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas.20 
 
According to the Supply Agreement, KEDO was in charge of preparing the construction site in 
Kumho, on North Korea’s northeast coast. The rural site had originally been chosen for LWRs 
that the Soviet Union promised North Korea in the mid 1980s but were never built. It still lacked 
the necessary infrastructure, etc.21 KEDO put in the infrastructure needed to support both the 
construction of the reactors and the thousands of its staff who worked there. This meant 
removing four million cubic meters of rock and soil from a mountain to create a foundation for 
the nuclear reactors, and building a port, roads, housing, and a medical facility, among other 
things.22 In August 2002, a ceremony was held to mark the pouring of concrete for the first LWR 
unit.23 
 
KEDO’s work implementing the Agreed Framework helped promote nuclear nonproliferation 
norms, although the gains were reversed when the project ended. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency began monitoring the freeze of North Korea’s five nuclear facilities a month 
after the October 1994 signing of the Agreed Framework. While largely symbolic, the IAEA also 
resumed in March 1996 ad hoc and routine inspections at small nuclear facilities that were not 
subject to the freeze.24 Had the project moved forward, North Korea would have had to come 
into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and solved the issue of its past 
plutonium production before the LWRs were completed. 25 
 
 
How multilateral cooperation helped the project 
 
The largest benefit of the multinational approach embodied in KEDO was that it made the 
project financially feasible. With the United States unwilling to pay for the project by itself, 
additional financing was a necessity. South Korea offered to fund 70 percent of the estimated 
$4.6 billion needed for the two LWR units, and Japan agreed to pay 116.5 billion yen, or about 
$1 billion at the time.26 This still left a shortfall in funding, but it was hoped that other countries 
would step up. The Supply Agreement was written in such a way that North Korea was required 
to repay KEDO the cost to build the reactors over a 20-year term without interest, starting after 
the units were completed.27 Some KEDO members thought that repayment was unlikely.28  
 
The more immediate problem confronting KEDO was raising the funds to provide the 500,000 
tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) that were to be shipped to North Korea annually while the reactors 
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were being constructed. The United States took the lead in the fundraising effort, but it 
consistently faced difficulties. Raising funds domestically became particularly challenging after 
the Republican Party, which was largely hostile to the Agreed Framework, gained control of both 
houses of Congress in the 1994 midterm elections. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in 
Congressional testimony in January 1995 that he expected the annual cost of the project for the 
United States to be “in the range of $20 to $30 million,”29 a vastly underestimated sum. Facing 
domestic problems, the United States invited the European Union (EU) to join KEDO as part of 
an effort to ensure funding for the HFO shipment. The EU was given representation on the 
KEDO Executive Board in exchange for its contribution of $15 million a year for five years. But 
even with additional contributions from non-Executive Board members, the funds for the HFO 
still fell short.30 As such, HFO delivery to North Korea was often late. To prevent further delays, 
Japan provided funds for an account that could be used to finance the HFO delivery, under the 
condition that the money be replenished at the earliest possibility. 31 Yet even then, HFO 
shipments lagged.  
 
Another benefit of the multinational approach was that it helped some member countries win the 
domestic support necessary to secure their contributions to the LWR construction and HFO 
shipments. In selling the deal to members of the U.S. Congress, Clinton administration officials 
argued that Japan and South Korea were contributing the lion’s share of the cost of the project 
and that the two allies were sufficiently committed to the agreement.32 The Japanese Foreign 
Ministry made a similar argument in its domestic process. It believed that wider participation in 
KEDO would help strengthen its case for Japan shouldering part of the cost for the LWR 
project.33 South Korea was the outlier in the equation. Because it was providing the largest share 
of the funds for LWR construction it wanted a smaller and concentrated decision-making 
structure.34 
 
There were other political benefits to KEDO’s structure. For instance, the EU’s participation 
raised awareness of the North Korean issue in a region where it was not a priority.35 Another 
important benefit was the fact that the structure also played into broader U.S. political goals to 
encourage interaction between North Korea and South Korea.36 North Korea at first resisted 
South Korea’s inclusion in any part of the Agreed Framework process. Indeed, North Korea 
initially rejected accepting South Korean origin reactors for the project. Once the North agreed to 
have the reactors supplied by the South, they insisted on calling the reactors “American” because 
of the origin of the technology. Meanwhile, the South Korean’s wanted the reactors to be 
referred to as “Korean” reactors. The impasse was settled when the two sides agreed to a 
technical description of the type of reactor that was to be built.37 
 
Once KEDO began its operations, however, the inclusion of South Korea became a useful 
vehicle for regular contact between the two Koreas on all levels. Choi Young Jin, KEDO’s first 
South Korean deputy executive director, called the arrangement “a camouflaged inter-Korean 
dialogue.”38 These contacts included interactions at the reactor construction site in Kumho, 
where North Koreans interacted daily with workers from South’s Korea Electric Power 
Corporation (KEPCO), which won the contract to provide the LWR units.39 The interactions not 
only promoted understanding between the two groups, but also exposed the North Koreans to 
modern technology and methods of managing such a technical project.40 
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KEDO’s multilateral structure also helped when disputes arose between parties. One way was by 
giving the organization more options for working around a potentially disruptive situation. For 
example, when North Korea withdrew its workers from the project demanding more pay in 2001, 
KEDO hired mostly ethnic Korean workers from Uzbekistan, a KEDO member, to take their 
place. While this move proved more expensive than giving the North Koreans the pay raises that 
they were demanding, some KEDO members thought it was an important opportunity to show 
the North Koreans that they were not going to give in to what they viewed as unreasonable North 
Korean demands.41  
 
More generally, interaction between KEDO members and their North Korean counterparts 
reduced potential misperceptions and at times prevented disruptive problems from exacerbating. 
A South Korean KEDO member, for example, recalls a time when negotiations were deadlocked 
due to North Korea’s demand that KEDO’s ships turn off their communication and navigation 
systems when entering a North Korean port. A North Korean delegate explained to him on the 
side that work was underway to overcome strong military objections, and asked for some time. 
The issue was resolved in a following meeting as the North Korean indicated.42 
 
 
What did not work well 
 
Despite the benefits of the multinational approach embodied by KEDO, it also raised some 
challenges that hindered the project’s success. One was the impact of historical enmity and 
politics outside of the project interfering with the process. In one example, work was delayed 
because Japanese officials objected to the use of the label “East Sea” in an environmental report 
for the project, insisting that it be changed to “Sea of Japan,” which is what Tokyo calls the body 
of water surrounded by Japan, Sakhalin, and the Asian mainland.43 The references to “East Sea” 
were ultimately changed to “Sea” in the report.44 
 
Another was the difference in the countries’ political approach and culture. For instance, while 
many of the American members of KEDO were contractors employed for the duration of the 
project, the Japanese and South Korean governments sent representatives from their various 
ministries for a limited-time assignment. This meant that a unified sense of mission was only 
achieved after much effort.45  
 
Differing technical standards among KEDO countries also sometimes held up progress. For 
instance, Japan hesitated to approve additional funding for the LWR construction when an 
American industrial organization asked for the project to meet U.S. construction standards for 
concrete anchors.46 Tokyo’s unwillingness had little to do with the LWR project in North Korea. 
Instead, it had everything to do with its desire to avoid setting a precedent for its own 
construction standards at home.47 
 
 
How did KEDO deal with its problems? 
 
KEDO opened a small office in Kumho manned by Americans, Japan and South Koreans to 
maintain a working relationship with North Korea at the reactor construction site and to deal 
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with any disagreements or disputes.48 The KEDO office in Kumho (KOK) provided consular 
protection for KEDO workers, had diplomatic interactions with the North Korean authorities, 
informed KEDO headquarters in New York of the situation on the ground, and maintained some 
technical oversight over the project.49 For example, KOK dealt with a case in which a South 
Korean truck driver hit a North Korean on the construction site and had to be repatriated. When a 
North Korean sought asylum in the KEDO compound at the construction site, he was quietly 
turned away by KEDO’s unarmed security forces.50 
 
KEDO also worked to bring cohesion to its multi-national staff working at its New York 
headquarters. It enhanced communication among the staff, including at informal social 




What remained unresolved? 
 
The LWR project lost its momentum after U.S. President George W. Bush came into office in 
2001 with skepticism about the Agreed Framework. Work on the LWR units and the HFO 
shipments were gradually terminated after the United States confronted North Korea about its 
pursuit of a covert highly enriched uranium program in 2002. KEDO formally ended its 
operations in 2006.  
 
Even had the project moved forward, it would have faced numerous challenges. One was the 
question of North Korea’s past nuclear activities. The Agreed Framework stipulated that North 
Korea come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement before key nuclear 
components of the LWRs were to be installed in Kumho. This meant that North Korea would 
have had to revisit the discrepancies that the IAEA found in the country’s declaration on past 
plutonium production, which was the origin of the nuclear crisis that led to the Agreed 
Framework. 
 
The project to construct the LWRs also had some outstanding technical problems. One issue 
concerned the North Korean electrical grid. North Korea’s outdated electrical grid would not 
have been able to handle the electricity generated by one LWR unit, let alone two.52 None of the 
KEDO members wanted to assist North Korea with upgrading its electrical grid, which would 
have cost more than a billion dollars.53 In addition, the North Koreans didn’t have an off-site 
power system for the operation of the LWR units,54 without which it couldn’t power coolant 
pumps in the case of a reactor shutdown. 
 
Another sizeable challenge was negotiating a U.S.-North Korean nuclear cooperation agreement. 
The North needed such an agreement because major components of the reactors were based on 
U.S. technology, even if they were provided to North Korea by the South.55 Questions about 
nuclear liability also remained unsolved. Should an accident occur at the reactors, would North 
Korea be able to make payments for damages? The lack of a liability regime was a particular 
concern for the companies providing components to the project.56 
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Conclusion 
 
The conclusion and implementation of the Agreed Framework would have been a difficult task 
regardless of who the United States partnered with. The relationship between the U.S. and North 
Korean governments was hostile going back decades, and the North lacked the infrastructure, 
skills, and experience to deal with the construction of large-scale nuclear reactors. Yet, the 
partnership between the United States, Japan, and South Korea—and the eventual inclusion of 10 
other states—helped to address some of the largest problems associated by the Framework and 
laid the foundation for broader cooperation with the North in a way that would have been 
infeasible if the United States alone would have tried to fulfill its terms. 
 
Despite its challenges, KEDO negotiated a supply agreement and eight protocols that were 
necessary for the LWR project, and built the necessary infrastructure in Kumho to support the 
construction of the reactors. KEDO also divided the financial cost of implementing the 
agreement in a way that enabled sustained domestic buy-in in the participating states. It also 
facilitated regular interaction between North and South Korea, including at the Kumho 
construction site. While conflicts did arise within KEDO, they never reached a point where they 
threatened the project. 
 
Would KEDO have worked better had it included more countries, particularly regional powers 
China and Russia? KEDO would certainly have welcomed more financial contributions, and 
there would likely have been benefits to including countries that have diplomatic relations and 
embassies in North Korea. But given the challenges KEDO faced as the United States worked 
with its allies, it is also easy to imagine the problems that would have had to be overcome had 
China or Russia played a role in the organization. 
 
Given the unique political environment in North Korea, KEDO’s experience is not necessarily 
transferable to other cases where multilateral nuclear energy cooperation is being considered. 
However, it does demonstrate the range of potential benefits that could derive from such 
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